Rothbard's treatment of Smith on its own terms, however. To this end, we reconsider four main areas of contention in each of the sections that follow: the division of labor and economic development, the determination of value and prices, the specie flow mechanism and international trade, and the invisible hand. We then conclude with a brief discussion of the rhetorical structure of
WN.
We are not the first to appraise Rothbard's achievements as an intellectual historian and, as one referee notes, his advocates have defended his critique of Smith as both a 'deliberate exaggeration' and a 'textbook abbreviation' of Rashid's (1998) controversial work. 2 We are of course sensitive to the issue of authorial intention, more so since we shall ourselves claim that Rothbard misconstrues the rhetorical structure of WN, but remain unconvinced. In any case, much of what follows is applicable to 'muted' versions of Rothbard's arguments. Concerning the first line of defense, it seems to us that the villification of Smith is as much the consequence of Rothbard's overenthusiastic attachment to the so-called 'Kauder thesis' as it is a strategic decision. Kauder (1953 Kauder ( , 1965 turned the Weberian thesis about Protestantism and the rise of capitalism on its head: from this perspective, Smith, the moderate Calvinist, is suspicious of the individual and Cantillon, the Roman Catholic, is a bona fide champion of unfettered markets. The problem is that without Smith's Calvinism, the nexus between the classical tradition Rothbard opposes and Protestantism individualism of Adam Smith and his school.' Furthermore, he asserts that 'we can still learn more about the behavior of men from [WN] than from most of the more pretentious modern treatises on social psychology ' (ibid, p. 138) . Inasmuch as the same paper also demonstrates Hayek's familiarity with Adam Ferguson's Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767) and other influential 'pre-Adamite' works, it cannot be said, contra Rothbard (1995) and Rashid (1998) , that Smith's intellectual debts have somehow been obscured. The admiration of von Mises and at least some of his followers for Smith is perhaps less enthusiastic, but still quite real.
almost vanishes: the assimilation of Ricardo, the 'Portuguese Jew turned Quaker ' (pp. xii, 444) on the basis of James Mill's influence, is facile, and the identification of Marx as a Protestant thinker, either German or British, is tenuous prima facie. Without Ricardo or Marx, the post-Cantillon 'Kauderization' of economics stands or falls on Smith's ostensible heresies, and this, in turn, boxes Rothbard in.
As far as the second 'line of defense' is concerned, we, too, find the influence of Rashid (1998) on Rothbard to be obvious and substantial, but to the extent that this includes the particular issues discussed here, our criticisms extend to both. 3 This does not mean, of course, that Rothbard's principal theme, the mature Smith's obvious reluctance to champion unfettered markets, is itself suspect. For most intellectual historians, however, the evolution ( Pack (1998) and Trescott (1998) .
3
This said, we do not discuss two of Rashid's most controverial claims here -that Smith, the eventual customs officer, was a 'friend of the state,' and an incorrigible plagiarist. We should mention, however, that other Austrians (Hayek, 1948 , for example) familiar with both Smith and his predecessors have not reached the same conclusion. For a brief review of Rashid's The Myth of Adam Smith (1998) from a non-Austrian perspective, see Harcourt (1999) . principal motive of human action. Raphael & Macfie (1982) and Heilbroner (1982) reconsidered the problem, its intellectual roots and its 'solution' in considerable detail, and, from our perspective, brought the debate to a sensible close. 4 Rothbard's demonization of Smith, ironic inasmuch as the intellectual bonds that connect Smith and Marx are well known, is first manifested in his peculiar explanation of WN's canonical status. In his account, the difficulties of WN stimulated the establishment of cottage industries that attempted to 'clarify and systematize the contributions of the Master' (p. 437) and which, in turn, staked WN's claim as the Bible of political economy. The reader is invited to infer that it became influential because it was 'sprawling, inchoate [and] confused ' (p. 436) . This is an old bluff, well known from the literature on Keynes, and one that confuses correlation for causation. The observation that some, even most, of the watershed contributions to economics -a list that includes WN but also, for example, Böhm-Bawerk's Theory of Capital -reveal the strains of what Keynes (1936, p. iv) called 'long struggle[s] of escape ... from the old [ideas], which ramify ... into every corner of our minds' does not mean that their elevation was somehow the result of unresolved confusions and internal contradictions. Nor does it mean that confusion or, for that matter, length is a precondition for influence. In more specific terms, it is unreasonable to attribute Smith's pivotal role within the classical tradition to his successors' inabilities to penetrate and resolve the confusions in WN.
The Division of Labor

4
Heilbroner (1982, p. 427) , for example, concludes that 'the economic man who is the active agent of [WN] is the prudent man who is the product of [TMS] .' The 'problem' admits other solutions, of course; see, for example, Collings & Ortmann (1997) .
Rothbard is correct, albeit in a narrow sense, when he observes, following Schumpeter (1954) , that the division of labor assumes a 'swollen and gigantic importance ' (p. 441) 'not Austrian' from 'not at all.' Smith identifies several sources of innovation and technological improvement in the sections on the division of labor, but none involves the much lamented entrepreneur or, to be more precise, the entrepreneur as either 'projector' or 'speculator' (Pesciarelli, 1989 In another well known passage that follows, Smith draws attention to specialized groups of inventors and technicians, an example of the division of labor across occupation and function:
Many improvements have been made by the ingenuity of the makers of the machines, when to make them became the business of a particular trade; and some by that of those who are called philosphers or men of speculation, whose trade it is, not to do anything, but to observe everything ... In the progress of society, philosophy or speculation becomes, like every other employment, the principal or sole trade of a particular class of citizens. (WN, p. 10)
Furthermore, it can be said that Smith anticipated at least one modern theory of entrepreneurship, in particular Wiggins' (1995) . In his discussion of 'the five circumstances … which vary the wages of labour, ' Smith (1776, p. 111) includes an explanation of how 'the wages of labour in different employments vary according to the probability or improbability of success in them.' 'To excel It is not just the 'swollen importance' of the division of labor in WN to which Rothbard objects, however, but also the ostensible account of its origins.
Following Cannan, Smith's familiar 'propensity to truck, barter and exchange' is dismissed as a poor substitute for the benefits of trade in a world where endowments, preferences and methods of production can differ, the 'older and truer motive power of specialization' (pp. 442-443) Rothbard discerns in (Matthews, 1996; Michl, 1993) . Inasmuch as these are considered hallmarks of the modern industrial organization literature -
7
It should be remembered, contra Rothbard and most Austrians, that this issue remains unsettled. In their critique of Becker's 'new home economics,' for example, Folbre & Hartmann (1988) underscore the implicit presumption that male/female differences are the cause of the division of labor within households, rather than its predictable effect. For another example, see Rossetti's (1992) deconstruction of Menger.
see Klein & Leffler (1981) , Wiggins (1995) and Holmstrom & Tirole (1988) , for example -Smith's achievements are all the more remarkable.
Rothbard then endorses the charge, first popularized in West (1964) , that there is a 'total contradiction' in the treatments of the division of labor between the First and Fifth Books of WN: West and others have found it difficult to reconcile the defense of affordable education in Book V, which is in some measure predicated on the deleterious effects of specialization, with the identification of the division of labor as the wellspring of economic growth in Book I. Such criticism misses the mark, however, to the extent that it rests on the suspect notion that broad economic phenomena (in particular, industrialization) must be unidimensional. In crude terms, there is no logical contradiction in the proposition that X causes both Y and Z, and that Y is desirable but Z is not. Between whatever places foreign trade is carried on, they all of them derive two distinct benefits from it. It carries out that surplus part of the produce of their land and labour for which there is no demand among them, and brings back in return for it something else for which there is a demand. It gives a value to their superfluities, by exchanging them for something else, which may satisfy a part of their wants, and increase their enjoyments. 
109) notes, 'Smith's emphasis upon the use of coal in iron-making is highly
revealing, for widespread use of coal in place of charcoal occurred only after mid-century at the Carron Company, which pioneered the Darby process,' and that David Hume discussed the finances of Carron with Smith (Hollander, 1973, p. 216) ; that 'Smith was thoroughly familiar with the severe problems relating both to the perfection and commercial application of the steam engine' (Hollander, 1973, p. 217) ; that he discussed the short run consequences of free trade on fixed investments in silk; and that the same Cannan index includes four specific references to the construction and maintenance of canals (WN, pp. 147, 682, 684, 714 We also find it difficult to substantiate Rothbard's claim that 'whereas market price is changeable and ephemeral [in WN], "cost" is somehow 9 Smith's world is likewise not one in which Schumpeterian winds of 'creative destruction' forever disturb a relative calm. There is little doubt that Smith claimed that purchasing power over labor (labor commanded) was a measure of the value of commodities. Most historians also believe, however, that Smith also hints that the value of commodities is equal to the labor, both direct and indirect, required to produce them (labor embodied). Ricardo, who discerned the presence of both in WN, also demonstrated that the two were inconsistent, and argued for the latter.
consequences of Marxism ' (p. 453) . This is at best reckless, however. First, and most important, it should be recalled that the much discussed sixth chapter opens with:
In that early and rude state of society which precedes both the accumulation of stock and the appropriation of the land, the proportion between the quantities of labour necessary for acquiring different objects seems to be the only circumstance which can afford any rule for exchanging them for one another. (WN, p. 47)
But, a few paragraphs later, Smith recognizes that:
[In more advanced states, the labourer] must in most cases share [the whole produce of labour] with the owner of the stock which employs him. Neither is the quantity of labour commonly employed in acquiring or producing any commodity the only circumstance which can regulate the quantity which it ought commonly to purchase, command or exchange for. An additional quantity, it is evident, must be due for the profits of the stock which advanced the wages and furnished the materials of that labour.
(WN, p. 49)
Rothbard's failure to disclose Smith's caveat, let alone discuss it, is seriously misleading.
Second, it is absurd to hold Smith responsible for the 'momentous consequences' of Marxism because, as Marx himself noted, Ricardo's identification of labor as the source of value was definitive and much more influential. (Once more, the choice of Smith over Ricardo as 'villain' baffles us. 11 )
11
One of our referees speculates that Rothbard's reluctance to villainize Ricardo reflects his preference for the 'deductive spirit' of Principles of Political Economy, in contrast to the 'inductive spirit' characteristic of WN and, for that matter, TMS. If so, this preference must have been quite pronounced: few historians of economics would claim that Smith's commitment to the labor embodied notion of value, the basis for the 'momentous consequences of Marxism,' rivaled Ricardo's.
Third, to describe Smith's deliberations on the particular role of socialized labor in the creation and measurement of value as new is to suppose an intellectual vacuum where none existed. As Meek (1956, p. 41 ) observes:
The notion that the exchange of commodities is in essence the exchange of labour of the men who produce them became something of a commonplace as the century progressed. Writers like Hume, Gervaise and Tucker popularized the idea that commodities produced for exchange consisted essentially of a mass of congealed or crystallized social effort. Others, like Frances Hutcheson, developed the concept of the social division of labour, and some, like Harris, developed it in close association with a theory of value which laid considerable emphasis on labour.
Commonplace or not, the notion of labor value was, in various and sometimes inconsistent incarnations, an important element of the intellectual culture in which Smith worked. Finally, Rothbard's own choice of textual evidence is itself peculiar:
The real price of every thing ... is the toil and trouble of acquiring it. What every thing is really worth to the man who has acquired it, and who wants to dispose of it or exchange it for something else, is the toil and trouble which it can save himself, and which it can impose upon other people. (WN, p. 30) This comes not from the sixth chapter of Book I, however, but the fifth -'Of the Real and Nominal Price of Commodities' -and leads into the discussion of labor commanded, not labor embodied, as an index of 'real' value.
Monetary Theory
Rothbard (pp. 460-462) When the quantity of gold and silver imported into any country exceeds the effectual demand, no vigilance of government can prevent its exportation. All the sanguinary laws of Spain and Portugal are not able to keep their gold and silver at home ... If, on the contrary, in any particular country their quantity fell short of the effectual demand, so as to raise their price above that of the neighbouring countries, the government would have no occasion to take any pains to import them. (WN, p. 404) For Smith, then, the specie flow mechanism constituted the stabilizing dynamics around the equilibrium distribution of specie across nations, the architectonic structure of international finance.
Rothbard's fascination with Humean 'process analysis' and his rejection of such equilibria as chimerical -see the discussion of natural prices -blinds him to Smith's broader purpose. Because the search for the form and determinants of this equilibrium is Smith's principal focus, which leads to the first of the Rothbard's 'faults,' the second was perhaps inevitable to the extent that the integration of monetary and value theories provided the desired structure. In more provocative terms, Hume and, for that matter, Cantillon do not commit the same alleged 'errors' because neither characterizes the rest points for the specie flow mechanism.
The Invisible Hand
Rothbard's lament that the economist most identified with the invisible hand metaphor was a reluctant champion of free markets is of course correct, and this is perhaps what most non-specialist readers should remember about Economics Before Adam Smith. 12 The substance of Rothbard's critique is the familiar catalogue of 'obligations of the state' found in Book V -defense of the realm, public education, public works, coins and regulation of paper, etc. Because it is familiar and has been so for decades (Knies, 1883 , for example), however, we suspect that few Austrians or libertarians will be outraged anew, or that few interventionists will find fresh comfort. It is therefore disappointing that
Rothbard chooses not to evaluate Smith's specific rationale for each.
Smith possessed an exceptional, and almost modern, understanding of the strategic dimensions of rhetorical, moral and economic issues, and this is nowhere more evident than in Book V of WN. In particular, there is an awareness that the same incentive structure was characteristic of such problems as the interaction of speaker/writer and listener/reader (Collings & Ortmann, 1997) , the acquisition of self-command (Ortmann & Meardon, 1995) , the extraction of effort (Matthews & Ortmann 1997) , incentives in joint-stock companies, teaching and preaching (Ortmann 1999) , and incentives in the provision of public goods and the remedies for externalities.
The incentive structure of each of these problems is isomorphic to a principal-agent or prisoners' dilemma game. In these situations, players must choose between two actions -in principal-agent games, trust or monitor/inspect
12
We were surprised, in fact, that Rothbard even concedes Smith's commitment to the metaphor. Rothschild (1995) , for example, finds that both references to an invisible hand in Smith's writing and lectures before WN were ironic, and suggests that the famous third, buried in Book IV, could be, too. Smith was not, of course, an unqualified advocate of state intervention, and devoted considerable attention to the possibilities for abuse. He also understood the relative costs and benefits of the two principal enforcement mechanisms -reputation and third parties. While he characterized the incentive problems that afflicted joint-stock companies, and educational and ecclesiastical institutions, for example, his commitment to market-based solutions -which build on reputational enforcement of quality and effort -was a consistent one.
Smith also stressed the need for application of a 'benefit principle' whenever possible. 13 This, too, seems lost on Rothbard, who never considers the circumstances that led Smith to consider state intervention.
13
This is the simple, if not then well understood, principle that even if markets fail, the benefits of state intervention ought to be weighed against its possible costs.
Conclusion
From a more general standpoint, Rothbard fails to discern the rhetorical structure of WN. The infamous Book V, perhaps the first modern treatment of incentive-compatible state intervention, was one of Smith's principal concerns. 14 He could not make the case for efficient, and one assumes limited, intervention, however, without a prior critique of mercantilist forms of intervention. Even this approach required rhetorical strategies, however, inasmuch as some, perhaps most, of his intended audience were otherwise predisposed. Smith, whose earlier lectures demonstrate a remarkable command over rhetorical principles, chooses to emphasize first the desirable properties of economic freedom in Books I, II and III -he writes in obvious but not explicit opposition to mercantilismand to postpone his direct criticism of mercantilist principles until Book IV, when the reader's confidence has been won. It is not until after this, in Book V, that he is free to articulate his own, more nuanced, case for appropriate state intervention. Judged in terms of modern theories of the state and firm (Tirole 1988 (Tirole , 1994 , he succeeds.
Rothbard's neglect of the modern literature on incentives therefore exacerbates the flaws in his treatments of both Das Adam Smith Problem and modern scholarship on Smith. Given these, few readers, Austrian or otherwise, will find Economic Thought Before Adam Smith a decisive contribution to our understanding of the discipline's foundations.
